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Respecting Your Elders: The "Highly
Marketable" Skills Standard for Social
Security Disability Claimants over Age Sixty
Kerns v. Apfel'
I. INTRODUCTION
As individuals age, they may face barriers to obtaining employment that did
not exist for them when they were younger. Age thus may become a factor in
any assessment of the likelihood that persons will successfully find new work.
For Social Security disability benefits claimants under age fifty, age is generally
not considered to present an obstacle to adjusting to new employment contexts.
However, for claimants over age fifty, age is acknowledged as a factor that may
significantly impact their ability to adjust to new work.
For workers over age sixty, age has been deemed by the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") to be a barrier not only to their ability to do work, but

also to their ability to get work.' Both the statute and the regulations addressing
the disbursement of Social Security disability benefits contain specific language
indicating that a claimant's ability to obtain work is not a factor in determining
the existence of a disability.3 Nonetheless, every circuit considering the issue
has interpreted the regulations as requiring a finding that claimants over age
sixty possess skills that will enable them to obtain work before they can be found
to have "transferable" skills.
In Kerns v. Apfel,4 a case of first impression, the Eighth Circuit allied itself
with the other circuits that have considered the issue of what must be shown to

1. 160 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 1998).
2. See Larry M. Gropman, Social Security, 1995 DET. C.L. REv. 773, 782 (1995)
(explaining that "advancing age becomes an increasingly impenetrable barrier to
obtaining employment"); infra note 3.
3. See Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1257 n.1 1(7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that
the statute contemplates age as a vocational factor which affects a person's ability to
perform and not to obtain work). The regulations state: 'Age' refers to how old you are
(your chronological age) and the extent to which your age affects your ability to adapt
to a new work situation and to do work in competition with others." 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(a) (1998) (emphasis added). The statute provides:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he appliedfor work.
42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
4. 160 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 1998).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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deny Social Security disability benefits to claimants over age sixty. In order to
deny benefits to these claimants, an inquiry into an individual claimant's ability
to obtain employment is required; a showing that the claimant is able to perform
a specific type of employment is insufficient. This Note explores the lack of an
explicit statutory dictate upon which the Kerns court relied, and the wisdom of
allocating Social Security entitlements to those capable of working.'
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 1, 1994, Danny C. Kems ("Kerns") applied for disability
benefits under the Social Security Act.6 Kems claimed that he was suffering
from Paget's disease of the hip.' Kems's application was denied, and upon
reconsideration was denied again.' He appealed the denial to an Administrative
Law Judge ("AL"), who conducted a hearing in November 1995. 9 At the
hearing, Kems testified that his Paget's disease prevented him from working
because it caused him constant pain, disturbed his sleep, impaired his ability to
concentrate, and prohibited him from standing or sitting for extended periods of
time."
Kerns further testified that when he incurred his disability he worked at
a funeral home where his responsibilities included conducting funerals, lifting
caskets, and handling bookkeeping and accounting chores." He testified that he
had a high school education and two years of college, but that his sole academic
training in bookkeeping was from a high school class in accounting.' A
vocational expert testified that Kerns's accounting skills were transferable to
approximately 14,480 similar positions in Missouri without significant
vocational adjustment by Kerns. 3
5. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Symposium: Living Longer: A Legal Response to
Aging in America; Reforming SocialSecurity to Encouragethe Elderly to Work, 9 STAN.

L. & POL'Y REv. 289, 292 (1998) ("The most pressing problem is that Social Security is
in financial trouble, and quite simply, will not be able to meet its future benefit
commitments. Furthermore, the current Social Security system often unfairly
discourages the elderly from working."); see infra Part V.
6. Kems v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464,465 (8th Cir. 1998).
7. Id. (defining Paget's disease as a "generalized skeletal disease, frequently
familial, of older persons in which bone resorption and formation are both increased,
leading to thickening and softening of bones.., and bending of weight-bearing bones")
(quoting STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 501 (26th ed. 1995)).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1) (1998) requires, inter alia,that the claimant's

education be considered in determining whether his or her skills are transferable.
13. Id. There were 4,400 positions similar to Kerns's prior position in the Kansas
City area where Kerns lived. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/13
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The ALJ did not consider Kems's complaints of pain credible in the
absence of supporting medical evidence, and in light of Kems's testimony that
his daily activities included swimming and performing household chores.'4 The
ALJ determined that Kems was not suffering from a disability and denied him
Social Security benefits."
Kerns appealed the AL's determination to an Administrative Appeals
Council, which found that Kems had "the residual functional capacity for
sedentary work," and that he had transferable skills.1 6 In determining the
transferability of Kems's skills, the Appeals Council relied on a finding that
Kerns would need "no significant vocational adjustment" to function as a
bookkeeper. 7 The Appeals Council did not consider whether Kems's skills
were "highly marketable," and, after finding that his skills were transferable, the
Appeals Council found that Kerns was not disabled.' 8 The Appeals Council
denied benefits to Kerns.' 9
In 1997, Kems sought judicial review of the Appeals Council's decision
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.'0 In an
unpublished decision, the district court found substantial evidence on the record
as a whole to support the Appeals Council's decision and affirmed the denial of
not consider
benefits to Kerns." In reaching its decision, the district court did
22
the transferability or marketability of Kems's accounting skills.
In 1998, Kems appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 3 In a case of first impression, the court
found that the Appeals Council did not apply the appropriate legal standard
under the Social Security Act regulations, which impose a "progressively more
stringent burden" on the Appeals Council before disability benefits can be
denied as claimants get older.24 Kems was sixty-one years old at the time of his
hearing before the ALj.25 Under the regulations, claimants who are between
sixty and sixty-four years old, and who have a severe impairment, are not
to adjust to sedentary work unless their skills are "highly
considered able
26
marketable.,

14. Id.; see supra note 3.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P,app. 2, tbl. I).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 465 & n.5.
21. Id. at 465-66.
22. Id. at 466.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563 (1998)).
25. Id. at467.
26. Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1998)).
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The court determined that "highly marketable" is not the same as
"transferable," and that "highly marketable" imposes a higher burden on the
Appeals Council in considering a claimant's appeal.27 The court held that
because neither the ALJ nor the Appeals Council considered the marketability
of Kerns's skills, the decision to deny disability benefits was not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.28 The court vacated the judgment
of the district court and remanded to the Appeals Council for further
consideration of Kerns's claim in light of the proper legal standard.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Shortly after the Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, when the
Nation's unemployment rate peaked at over twenty-five percent, Americans
looked to the federal government to take a more active role in protecting them
from economic catastrophe.3" After President Franklin Roosevelt took office in
1932, he offered a "New Deal" to Americans.3 ' In this New Deal, Roosevelt
recommended that a social insurance safety net for the elderly be created, and his
recommendation ultimately was manifested in the Social Security Act of 1935.32
Congress33intended that Social Security function as earned assistance, not a
handout.
Social Security benefits are provided to workers under the age of sixty-five
who have become disabled. 34 Disability is defined in the statute in terms of an
individual's ability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity."3' The initial

27. Id. at468.
28. Id. at 469.
29. Id.
30. See William G. Dauster, ProtectingSocial Security and Medicare, 33 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 462, 462 (1996).
31. Id.
32. Id. The Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(e) (1994). Section 301 of
the statute provides in pertinent part:

For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish financial assistance to aged needy
individuals, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year
a sum sufficient to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made
available under this section shall be used for making payments to States
which have submitted... State plans for old-age assistance.

42 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
33. See Dauster, supranote 30, at 463 ("Congress created both Social Security and

Medicare as social insurance programs. Congress intended that they operate as earned
benefits, not as welfare.").
34. See Forman, supranote 5, at 289.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994). The statute defines "disability" as an:
[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/13
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burden to establish the existence of a disability is on the claimant who must
show that she is not currently working, that her impairment is severe, and that

she is unable to perform her prior work.36 This showing is part of a five-step
analysis required by the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Social Security
Act. If the claimant proves the first four elements, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant is able to perform other jobs.37 This

part of the analysis is concerned with the "marketability" of the claimant's
employment skills.
On August 20, 1980, a regulation requiring a heightened assessment of the
impact age has on a Social Security disability beneflits claimant's employment
prospects was added to the Social Security Act regulations.38 Under the
regulation, age generally will not be a factor for claimants under age fifty.39 For
claimants between fifty and fifty-four years old, age, coupled with a severe
impairment and narrow employment experience, becomes a factor in
determining the transferability of the claimant's skills for purposes of a finding
of disability. 40 For claimants fifty-five years old and over, age is considered to
significantly affect ability to work.41 A claimant between sixty and sixty-four
years old, who has a severe impairment, must be found to have "highly
marketable" skills before she can be42 considered to have skills that are
transferable to light or sedentary work.

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months ....
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1994).
36. See Kerns v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464, 466 n.6 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Fines v.
Apfel, 149 F.3d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1998); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1998)).
37. See Fines, 149 F.3d at 895.
38. Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1985)).
39. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b) (1999). The provision reads in part: "Younger
person. If you are under age 50, we generally do not consider that your age will seriously
affect your ability to adapt to a new work situation." Id.
40. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c) (1999). The provision reads: "Person approaching
advanced age. If you are closely approaching advanced age (50-54), we will consider
that your age, along with a severe impairment and limited work experience, may
seriously affect your ability to adjust to a significant number of jobs in the national
economy." 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1653(c) (1999).
41. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1999).
42. 20 C.F.R § 404.1563(d) (1999). The subsection reads:
Person of advanced age. We consider that advanced age (55 or over) is the
point where age significantly affects a person's ability to do substantial
gainful activity. If you are severely impaired and of advanced age and cannot
do medium work (see § 404.1567 (c)), you may not be able to work unless
you have skills that can be used in (transferred to) less demanding jobs which
exist in significant numbers in the national economy. If you are close to
retirement age (60-64) and have a severe impairment, we will not consider
you able to adjust to sedentary or light work unlessyou have skills which are
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In Tom v. Heckler,43 the Seventh Circuit became the first federal circuit to
consider the "highly marketable" skills standard in the context of an appeal from
a district court decision affirming a denial of a claimant's application for Social
Security disability insurance benefits. 4 In Tom, the claimant, David Tom, was
a sixty-two year old mechanical technician for Magnavox Corporation. 45 Tom
had undergone surgery for the removal of a kidney stone after which he
developed an incisional hematoma requiring drainage." Tom complained of
constant pain, loss of strength, muscle spasms, and high blood pressure. 47 After
an initial and subsequent denial of his application by the SSA, Tom received a
hearing before an AU. 48 The ALJ determined, based upon medical reports and
tests, and the testimony of a vocational expert, that Tom was able to perform
sedentary work. 49 The ALJ also found that Tom possessed skills that were
transferable to other work with very little adjustment so that Tom was not
disabled. 50 The court found that the ALJ failed to follow the new regulation in
neglecting to consider the impact Tom's age had on the transferability of his
skills."'
After a strong statement that the language of the new regulation was
"unmistakably clear," the Seventh Circuit went on to hold that Social Security
disability benefits claimants between sixty and sixty-four years old cannot be
found to possess transferable skills unless they possess "highly marketable"
skills.5 2 The court concluded that the ALJ did not consider whether Tom's skills
were "highly marketable" because the record was devoid of any mention of the
"highly marketable" standard and any citation to the regulation. 3 The court
reversed and remanded on the grounds that the record did not provide a basis for
finding whether Tom's skills were "highly marketable."5'4

highly marketable.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1999) (emphasis added).
43. 779 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1251.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1252.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1256.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1257.
54. Id. It is interesting to note that the Tom court looked to the record to determine
whether there was evidence of transferability. The Kerns court reviewed a record that
showed there were over 4000 positions available in the claimant's area that were similar
to his prior work. Based on the reasoning in Tom, this evidence would seem to show
that Kerns possessed "highly marketable" job skills. See Kems v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464,
465 (8th Cir. 1998). Also helpful on this point is the Sixth Circuit's definition of "highly
marketable" containing the assertion that "[a]lso probative is the relative abundance of
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/13
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In a footnote, after asserting that the determination of a claimant's skills as
"highly marketable" should be left to the ALJ,the Tom court recognized that the
regulations do not define the standard "highly marketable. 55 The court
attempted to arrive at some definition by referring to the definition of "age" in
the regulations. 56 The court acknowledged that the statutory definition of
disability calls for an evaluation of vocational factors only insofar as they affect
a claimant's ability to perform jobs, not to get jobs, 7 but the court further
acknowledged that the SSA Secretary has recognized a connection between age
and the probability of obtaining employment.5
In Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,5 9 the Sixth Circuit,
addressing the issue of the "highly marketable" skills standard, stated that "the
regulation sets forth a straightforward command" that disability claimants
between sixty and sixty-four years of age cannot be found to have transferable
skills absent a finding that their skills are "highly marketable." The Varley court
asserted that this "straightforward command" is "intuitively reasonable" in light
of the recognition that older people have a more difficult time finding
employment. 0
To date, no circuit court has held that the regulation does not require a
consideration of older claimants' ability to obtain employment, even though the
statute pursuant to which the regulation was promulgated specifically provides
for evaluation of vocational factors in terms of the effect they have on the ability
to perform work.6' In 1994, the Sixth Circuit arrived at a definition of "highly
marketable" skills as those "acquired through specialized or extensive education,
training or experience, and which make the claimant's age not a deterrent or
even a consideration in the hiring process."62 Subsequently, the SSA adopted the
Sixth Circuit's definition of "highly marketable."'

jobs in the economy requiring the skills as compared to the relative scarcity of persons
possessing the necessary skills." Preslar v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d
1107, 1112 (6th Cir. 1994)).
55. Id. at 1257 n.11.
56. Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) (1985)).
57. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (1984)).
58. Id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 55353 (1978)).
59. 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 782.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (1994); see supra note 3 (quoting the relevant statutory
text).
62. Preslar v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1113 (6th Cir.
1994). The court reasoned that highly marketable skills are such that a claimant "enjoys
a significant advantage or edge over others competing for employment. Also probative
is the relative abundance of jobs in the economy requiring the skills as compared to the
relative scarcity of persons possessing the necessary skills." Id. at 1112.
63. HARVEY C. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES (4th ed.

1991 & Supp. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In Fines v. Apfel,64 the Eighth Circuit determined that a sixty year old
claimant was not entitled to Social Security disability benefits because he had
acquired transferable skills in his work as a truck driver. The majority in Fines
' At the
did not discuss whether the claimant's skills were "highly marketable."65
time of the AL's decision to deny benefits, the claimant was fifty-seven years
old. The dissenting judge, Circuit Judge Heaney, asserted that the applicable
legal standard was the "highly marketable" skills standard contained in the
regulations.' Judge Heaney is supported by the Sixth Circuit in his contention
that the a claimant's age at the time of the decision is dispositive 7 Other than
in the dissenting opinion in Fines, the "highly marketable" skills standard had
not been addressed by the Eighth Circuit until Kerns v. ApfeL68
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Kerns v. Apfel,69 the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that consideration of
what constitutes "highly marketable" skills is an endeavor undertaken without
the benefit of guidance from the regulations. 0 The court also recognized that the
statute and regulations contain specific language informing claimants that a
disability is defined in terms of the ability to perform work, not in terms of
difficulties the claimants might experience in obtainingwork.7'
However, the court found that the regulations support the proposition that
age is directly related to the probability of obtaining employment. 72 The court
also looked to the structure of the regulations to determine that "highly
marketable" skills are not the same as transferable skills. 73 Finally, the court

64. 149 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 1998) (Heaney J., dissenting).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 896 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1998)).
67. See Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 780-81 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding that "the claimant's age as of the time of the decision governs in
applying the regulations.... The fact that a claimant who is unable to engage in such
activity at the time of the decision may have been able to do so at some point in the past
goes to the question of the onset date, not the question of disability.").
68. 160 F.3d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Consideration of the term 'highly
marketable' is an issue of first impression in this court.").
69. Id.
70. Id. ("Our task is made more difficult by the lack of any express definition of
the term in the regulations.").
71. Id. at 467-68 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)(1994); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(c)
(1998); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) (1998)). This regulation reads in pertinent part: "We
will determine that you are not disabled if your residual functional capacity and
vocational abilities make it possible for you to do work which exists in the national
economy, but you remain unemployed because of-(1) your inability to get work." 20
C.F.R. § 404.1566(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at468.
73. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/13
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aligned itself with the precedent set by other circuits that have reached a judicial
definition of the term "highly marketable" skills.74 The court stated that "it
appears overwhelmingly evident to other courts passing upon the issue, and to
this court, that the regulations require something more than a mere
75 determination
of transferability for claimants approaching retirement age.,
In reaching its definition of "highly marketable" skills, the court quoted
another subsection of the regulation at issue, which explicitly states that age, as
a vocational factor, denotes calendar years as well as a claimant's ability to
"adapt to a new work situation and to do work in competition with others." 76
The regulation also states that "this section recognizes a direct relationship
between age and the likelihood of employment, 7 7 but then contains further
language concerning an older claimant's ability to adapt and compete.78
V. COMMENT
In Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 9 the Sixth Circuit
asserted that the regulations provide "a straightforward command" that,
claimants over age sixty shall be found to have transferable skills if their skills
are "highly marketable."" According to the court, it is "intuitively reasonable"
that the regulations should not be read otherwise.8' The Seventh Circuit has also
been reluctant to recognize the possibility of any ambiguity in the language of
the regulations and has stated that "[t]he language is unmistakably clear."8"
In a decision published four months after the regulations were amended to
include the regulation at issue, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan opined that the regulation "appears to interpret" the
regulation directing that, for claimants between sixty and sixty-four years old,
transferability of skills should be evaluated in terms of "vocational adjustment
required in terms of tools, work processes, work settings, or the industry." 3 As
is apparent, the regulation does not address the relevance of a claimant's ability

74. Id. at 468-69 (quoting Emory v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1092, 1094 (10th Cir.
1991); Pineault v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 848 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1988);
Renner v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 1421, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1986); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d

1250, 1257 n.ll (7th Cir. 1985)).
75. Id. at 469 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d) (1998)).
76. Id. at 468 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) (1998) (emphasis added)).
77. Id. (quoting Preslar v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107,

1111 (6th cir. 1994) (emphasis added)).
78. Id.
79. 820 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 781-82.
81. Id. at 782.
82. Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1985).
83. Blake v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 528 F. Supp. 881, 887 n.15
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (quoting 20 C.F.R. subpt. P, app. 2 (1981)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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to obtain employment, but rather her ability to adjust to a new work
environment.
In Kerns v. Apfel, 4 the Eighth Circuit fell in step with the other circuits
interpreting the "highly marketable" skills standard in the new regulation. This
decision should provide some degree of assurance to Social Security benefits
claimants over age sixty that they will more likely be found "disabled" than their
younger co-workers unless their skills are "highly marketable." The fact that
there is no explicit statutory mandate for this decision is apparent. Nonetheless,
it is equally apparent that the circuits are intent on maintaining this interpretation
of the regulation.
Given that Congress has explicitly provided that age as a vocational factor
is to be considered in terms of its affect on a Social Security benefits claimant's
ability to perform rather than obtain work,85 and that the regulation also is
86
specific about the relevance of age as it affects a person's ability to do work,
courts arguably are not applying the law as it was written, but rather as they
think it should be written. The Social Security Act does include age as a factor
to be considered in determining whether an individual has a disability in so far
as age affects one's ability to "engage" in work.87 However, whether an
individual would be hired, or whether ajob for which her skills qualify her exists
in the economy, are not matters to be considered in the determination of the
existence of a disability. Therefore, to "engage" in work, as contemplated by
Congress, is not the same thing as to obtain work.
It appears that the courts are protecting a class of workers from employment
discrimination. What is not clear is whether there exists a statutory or regulatory
basis for doing so. It is important to recognize that Social Security benefits are

84. 160 F.3d 464 (8th Cir. 1998).
85. See Tom, 779 F.2d at 1257 n. 11(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that "the statutory definition of disability specifically provides that
vocational factors must be viewed in terms of their effect on the ability to perform jobs
rather than the ability to obtain them"). The statute provides:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired ifhe appliedfor work.
42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
86. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(a) (1999). The regulation states: 'Age' refers to how
old you are (your chronological age) and the extent to which your age affects your ability
to adapt to a new work situation and to do work in competition with others." 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1563(a) (1999).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (1994); see supra note 3 (quoting relevant statutory

text).
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not necessarily an unlimited resource.88 Of course there is a strong public policy
favoring judicial protection against employment discrimination, even a species
of discrimination so subtle as to consist of an atmosphere in which it is merely
"more difficult" for an older worker to obtain employment than a younger
worker.89 But the protection of Social Security funds from unnecessary
expenditure also merits judicial attention.
VI. CONCLUSION

It seems "intuitively reasonable" that older job applicants will be at a
disadvantage relative to younger ones competing for the same job. This would
appear a practical reality in much the same way that it is "intuitively reasonable"
to believe that many factors may induce an employer to reject job applicants
based on some characteristic other than aptitude. For example, a black, Jewish,
or female job applicant may face rejection on grounds of skin color, religion, or
gender. This is a distasteful and intolerable realization.
However, such a realistic recognition does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that skin color, religion, and gender should be factors in determining
the vocational adjustment question, as required under the regulations, of
claimants for Social Security Disability benefits. Arguably, what the circuits
have done in applying the "highly marketable" skills standard in particular cases
is socially and intuitively desirable. But the underlying question remains: In the
face of specific contrary language in the statute and regulations, is a claimant's
ability to obtain employment a legally appropriate inquiry?
THOMAS G. PIRMANTGEN

88. See Forman, supra note 5, at 289 ("Social Security is in financial trouble largely
because people are living longer and retiring at an earlier age. While there is a growing
number of Social Security beneficiaries, there are relatively fewer workers to support
them."); Dauster, supranote 30, at 462 ("[B]eginning in 2019, the Social Security Trust

Fund will stop running surpluses. Social Security's reserves, its accumulated surpluses,
will then begin to decline as the fund begins to pay out more than it brings in .... ).
89. Of interest in this regard is that none of the circuits discussed tangible evidence
tending to show that the elderly do indeed experience more difficulty finding
employment than their younger competition. There seems to be some acknowledged but

unexamined sociological assumption operating behind the courts' reasoning. For
example, the Sixth Circuit maintains that it is "intuitively reasonable" that older workers
are at a competitive disadvantage. Varley v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 820

F.2d 777, 782 (6th Cir 1987). It is not obvious that the court's "intuition" is a proper
source of evidence in review of an administrative decision.
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